Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1984

United States v. Louisiana
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Admiralty Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
U.S. v. Louisiana. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 20. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~l{tJJI)r atUJ;uJ {J)~~qj;l4l
/;al cAf~ MfUlJe.

f »?asfer

~/,tcke/e

May 24, 1984 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
Petition for Allowance of
Additional Compensation
and Reimbursement of
Expenses to the Special
Master

No. 9 Original
UNITED STATES

v.
LOUISIANA, et al.
SUNMARY:

[Special Master:
Walter P. Armstrong]

The Special Master requests a final allowance of

fees for his four years of service, bringing his total award to
$100,000.
FACTS:

Petr was appointed the Special Naster in this

litigation 15 years ago in 1969.

The present, arid possibly the

last, phase of the case commenced in 1980 when motions by
Mississippi and Alabama and cross-motions by the United States
were referred to petr as the Special Master.

In November 1982

the Court approved an interim award of $50,000 for petr's
services from February 1980 through July 31, 1982.
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Since then the Special Naster received 10 post-trial
documents, heard post-trial argument and received four
additional briefs.

On Feb. 10, 1984 the Special Master

forwarded to counsel his proposed final report.

Written

comments were filed and a conference was held to consider the
comments.

On Apr. 9, 1984 the Final Report (56 pages) was

delivered to the Clerk.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr requests a total fee of $100,000,

$50,000 over his interim award.

Half the award will be

initially paid by the United States.

Alabama and Mississippi

will initially pay one quarter of the award each.

The states

and the United States have approved and consented to the

---

application.

The Special Master also requests that the final

allocation of all payments to the Special Master "award the
conclusion of these proceedings, at which time any necessary
adjustment can be made."

Finally, the Special Master requests

that he "be relieved of any further duties and obligations under
the references of February 19 and March 17, 1980, pending
further orders of the Court."
Petr notes that before filing his report he heard 11 days
of trial at which more than 350 exhibits were filed.

Before

trial he had received some 74 documents including 11 depositions
which totaled 1,291 pages.

The

11

docket 11 for the four years that

the litigation has been before the Special Master reflects the
filing of some 94 documents.
DISCUSSION:

A review of the Special Master's 56-page

report reveals the complexity of this litigation.
Master dealt with

The Special

such concepts as straight baselines, juridical

- ~

bays, historic bays and historic territorial waters both
preceding and after the United States's adoption of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (the
Geneva Convention).

Not only did the parties disagree on the

facts and the United States' historic position but the United
States also argued that it was entitled to change its position.
Although the Special Master has not provided the Court with
a specific breakdown of the hours he spent on the case, the
parties have all approved the applicatiori and both the length of
time that the litigation consumed and its complexity suggest
that the requested allowance is reasonable.

If the Court has

any questions as to the amount requested, the Special Master
might be given the opportunity to supplement his application.
The Special Master's specific breakdown of the payment of
the allowance and expenses properly follows the interim division
agreed to by the parties.

The breakdown also credits

Mississippi with the additional payment of $12,500 that the
Court authorized Mississippi to advance (Oct. 31, 1983 order).
The Special Master notes that the final allocation among the
parties should await the conclusion of the proceeding.
Finally, the Special Master requests to be relieved of any
further duties and obligations pending further orders by the
court.

The Court may want to defer relieving the Special Master

until it enters a final decree.

The Special Master has no

further duty pending the Court's review of his report.

However,

if the Court relieved the Special Master now, it would have to
reappoint him if it wanted to remand all or part of the report
to the Special Master.

Since he has no obligations pending the

-

q

-

Court's decision on his report, there is no harm in deferring
his release.
CONCLUSION:

The complexity and longevity of this action,

as well as the parties' consent, support the Special Master's
request for additional compensation.

The Court, however, should

defer the Master's request to be relieved until the Court
reviews the Special Master's report.
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Exceptions of the United
States to the Report of
the Special Master

No. 9 Original
UNITED STATES

v.

Exceptions of Alabama to
the Report of the Special
Master

LOUISIANA, et al.

Exceptions of Mississippi
to the Report of the
S ecial Master

SUMMARY:

The Special Master

Sound
\. ~

1

is both a ~uridical and a historic bay and therefore its waters
0

~

- --- ----The United States has

---

are inland waters and all submerged lands belong exclusively to
the States.

filed exceptions contesting

~

the Master's conclusion.

The United States claims that the

portions of Mississippi Sound more than three miles from the
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mainland or an island belong to the United States.

Alabama and

Mississippi have filed exceptions advancing additional grounds
of support for the Master's conclusions.
The Court may wish to schedule oral argument on the
exceptions because they raise a number of questions concerning
the determination of boundaries which have national and
international ramifications.

Argument might be scheduled in

tandem with argument in No. 35 Original, United States v. Maine,
as both cases raise the issue of whether an

be

considered an extension of the mainland.
BACKGROUND:

~9~60

in renewed proceedings following

passage of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §1301
et

~.,the

Court held that the grant of territorial submerged

land to Alabama and Mississippi extende ~ ~ore than three

~

nautical miles into tbe Gulf of Mexico from their respective

)~

coastlines. VUnited States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 29-83,

~-

~

(1960).

~d.J~

The Court did not, however, locate the coastline from ~f.~

which the three-mile belt is to be measured.

Ht£-~f~

In due course, it became clear that the parties disagreed
on the treatment of Mississippi Sound, the water area
immediately south of the mainland shore of Hississippi and
1

Alabama, and north of certain I ringe island; (see exhibit 1).
The two states claim the whole of the Mississippi Sound as

5

inland waters, so that their coastline s begin at the islands.

~

/L~
~

The United States rejects the inland status of Mississippi Sound
and, accordingly claims as areas of exclusive federal interest
those portions of the Sound that are more than three miles from
either the mainland or any island.

-----

Such pockets exist because

some of the barrier islands are more than six miles from the
mainland.

To resolve this conflict the parties filed motions and
cross-motions for supplemental decrees.

The Court referred all

the pleadings to the already appointed Special Master.
1064 (1980) and 445 U.S. 923 (1980).

444 U.S.

A further motion for

relief by Mississippi was referred to the Special Master in
1982.

457 U.S. 1115 (1982).

After extended proceedings, the

Special Master submitted his Report on April 9, 1984,
recommending a decree in favor of the states.
~--------------~7

The Court ordered

the Report filed and called for exceptions.

The United States filed exceptions to the Master's Report.
Both Alabama and Mississippi also filed exceptions urging
additional grounds of support for the Master's conclusions.
Alaska has filed an amicus brief addressing issues that are of
particular concern to it in its boundary litigation (United
States v. Alaska, No. · 84 Original, presently pending before a
Special Master).
SPECIAL

~~STER'S

REPORT:

The Master starts his Report by

explaining the legal context for the dispute.

In United States

v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965) this Court adopted the

u/e

provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone (the Geneva Convention) as the basis for
~

determining the seaward boundaries of various states.

~es 3

and

lij,£ the

~ion

boundaries of the mainland
lines along the coasts.

a~

~~

1~

~~

Under

the seaward

islands extend from the low water

This creates ~nc : aves of ntgn seas] when

the islands are more than six miles from the mainland.
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention avoids this problem by
r(

"

allowing a country to draw its boundary along a fringe of

islands, thus enclosing the water between the islands and the
mainland.

This Court, however, has suggested that the use of

straight baselines is an optional method of establishing
boundaries and "should be left to the branches of Government
responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign
policy."

United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 72-73

( 1969).

Here the United States has declined to adopt the

-

~

f ~ traight baseline method.\\ The states nonetheless argue that the
United States has by its action (although not explicitly)
adopted the straight baseline method.

A similar argument was

made by Louisiana in a prior proceeding before the same Master.
The Master rejected the argument and the Court overruled
Louisiana's exceptions.

Un{~ed

Since the

420 U.S. 529 (1975).

States does not utilize the straight

baseline method, the Master turns to two other
treating the Mississippi Sound as inland wat

~

A.

Juridical Bays.

w~ within

a

~cal

J3ur ~

for ~~
t;'/ /2..-J~ U

~~

Under the Geneva Convention, the

baYJ are considered inland waters.

~~~

The ~~

Master notes that there are four requirements for a juridical
It must be a well marked indentation; (2) its
must be in such proportion to the width of its mouth
to contain landlocked waters and to constitute more than a
mere curvature of the coast; (3) it must have a closing line of
twenty-four miles or less; and (4) it must meet the semi-circle
test." 1

~-~~f-

~·

lThis last test is set forth in Article 7 of the Geneva
Convention as "[ A ]n ~ indentation shall not, however, be regarded
as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of
the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth
of that indentation."

~~
~

- 5 -

Before the criteria can be applied to Mississippi Sound,
the boundaries of the Sound must be determined.
the characterization of two islands; the
west and

fu;~ to

the east.

This involves

~sle Au ~ to

(see exhibit 1)

the

Article 7

of the Geneva Convention does not encompass bays formed in part
by islands which cannot realistically be considered part of the
mainland.

When faced with the question of whether an island

could be treated as part of the mainland, the Court in United
States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 66 (1969) stated:

6

While there is little objective guidance on this
question to be found in international law, the question 1. ~
wh~er a p~~and is to be trea_ted a &Jir L of YO
,
t ~d would__dgp..end on s ~ factors as i
ize, ~~.::A-its distance from the mai~dy.-the depth and utility ~ ~~~1.-~ () "'
of the .intervening waters ~e shape of the island or ~~, -~~
curvature of the coast.
.
~ ~

The Court also suggested that the Master might consider "any

4

other criteria and any evidence he finds it helpful to consider"
to determine whether an island is integrally related to the
mainland.
The western end of the Sound is not in issue as the United
States admits "that the Isle au Pitre might be treated as an
extension of the Louisiana mainland pursuant to the 1969
Louisiana decision [394 U.S. 11]."
The treatment of Dauphin Island is critical because if
Dauphin Island is not considered as part of the mainland, there
may be no eastern headland to enclose the Sound as a bay.
Dauphin Island is separated from the mainland at Cedar Point by
1.6 nautical miles.

The depth of the water in the straits is no

~

greater than six feet except for the dredged channel.

The

island is joined to the mainland by a bridge and is inhabited.

~

v

-

The Master bases his conclusion that Dauphin Island is part
of the mainland on the fact that the island is in the mouth of
Mobile Bay, which is a juridical bay.

-

The Master reasons:

There seems to be no doubt that under the Geneva
Convention internal waters are to be subsumed under
the general category of mainland. If this is correct,
then Dauphin Island, as llt ad joins the mainland, is
clearl an extension thereof; in effect, a _Eeninsula
extending westwardly
r from a na separating--the
Gulf of Mexico from Mississippi Sound.
Report at page 14.

---------

Once Dauphin Island is treated as part of the mainland, the
~

~ ~

Master has no trouble finding that the Sound meets the other
criteria for a juridical bay.

The total water distances between

the Isle au Pitre and Dauphin Island, along a line formed by the
barrier islands, totals 21.7641 miles, less than 24 miles.

The

Master finds that the Sound is a well-marked indentation with
six natural entrance points between the islands that form the
mouth of the juridical bay.

Re states "[T]he relation of

maximum penetration to width of mouth is therefore .4167:1,
which in my opinion is enough to constitute more than a mere
curvature of the coast."

Report at page 20.

The final consideration is whether the waters of the
Mississippi Sound are so enclosed as to be considered
landlocked.

The Master notes that the straight line distance

from Isle au Pitre to Dauphin Island is approximately 45 miles.
The water gap distance is 21.7641 miles and none of the gaps
between the islands is more than six miles in width.

The Master

concludes that the waters in the Sound are landlocked and that

the Mississippi Sound
B.

i~

Historic Bays.

The Special Master next addresses

the states' argument that the Sound is a historic bay.

'

..

The

Geneva Convention provides that its definitions shall not apply
to limit a state's claim to historic inland waters.

In United

States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975) the Court summarized the
criteria for a ~
The term "historic bay" is not defined in the Convention. The Court, however, has stated that in order
to establish that a body of water is a historic bay, a
coastal 7b ation ')must have "traditionally asserted and
maint ainea dom i nion with the ~ acqui e scence of foreign
nations~ UnTtea' States v. California, 381 U.S. at
172 . . . . Furthermore, the Court appears to have
accepted the general view that at least three factors
- ~
are significant in the determination of historic bay ~~
status: (1) the claiming nation must have exercised ~-~~~. ~
authority over the area~ ( Zy-that exercise must have ~~~
been continuous; and (3J £oreign states must have
~~
acquiesced in the exercise of authority. Louisiana
At~~~
Boundary Case, 394 at 75, . . .
(~-------\
(422 U.S. at 189).
t-L_:>;:; ~
The states claim that Nississippi Sound has been

clai~

the nations that possessed the surrounding mainland and islands
since at least 1756. · The United States, however, denies that
..------,
the Sound is a historic bay. In United States v. California,

381 U. S. 139 (1965) the Court held that the federal

~

~5,

~
~

government's disclaimer was entitled to considerable deference.
The Master and the states, however, note that in the Louisiana
Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 77, n. 104 the Court stated:
It is one thing to say that the United States
should not be required to take the novel, affirmative
step of adding to its territory by drawing straight
baselines. It would be quite another to allow tne
United States to prevent recognition of a historic
title which may already have ripened because of
past events but which is called into question for
the first time in a domestic lawsuit. The latter,
we believe would approach an im~ermissible contraction of territory against wh~ch we cautioned
in United States v. California.

The Master found that "during the period from 1756 to 1819
what is now Mississippi Sound was apparently considered by

K~,,

J-4,q

~~~

~

whatever nation possessed the surrounding mainland and islands
as part of its possession."

Report at page 28.

The Master

finds that the United States treated the Mississippi Sound as
inland water until 1971.

He notes that the Sound is relatively

shallow and that its navigational utility as an intracoastal
passageway was recogn'ized as early as 1817.

In 1822 the Sound

was described in Congress as a "little interior sea" and in 1840
plans were proposed for its military defense.

Plans for the

fortification of Ship Island, one of the fringe islands, were
proposed as early as 1847, authorized in 1857 and construction
was underway when the Civil War broke out.

The fort had a minor

role in the Civil War and was eventually abandoned in 1875.
Furthermore, in various papers filed with this Court2 and
Congress) the United States has characterized the Sound as
waters.

The Master also concluded that treating the Sound as

inland water was consistent with the United States' well-known
international position on boundaries.
The Master notes that this Court's prior decisions are not
dispositive.

In Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906), an

action between states in which the United States was not a
party, the Court appeared to suggest that the Mississippi Sound
was inland water.

However, in United States v. Louisiana, 363

U.S. 1 (1960) 1 the Court held that the states'acts of admission
did not necessarily convey title to all of the Sound.
2In its 1958 Brief in Sup~ort of Motion for Summary
Judgment on Amended Colliplaint Ln an earlier phase of this case,
the United States construed Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1
(1906) as describing Mississippi Sound as inland water which
therefore passed to the States on their entry into the Union.

'.

The Master found that the United States' first public
disclaimer concerning Mississippi Sound was made in April 1971
by a publication of a set of maps delineating a three-mile
territorial limit within the Sound.

He opined that:

They undoubtedly undertake to rescind the concession made by the United States in its brief in an
earlier stage of this proceeding. However under the
circumstances it is difficult to accept the disclaimer as entirely extrajudicial in its motivation.
It would appear to be more in the nature of an
attempt by the United States to prevent recognition
of any preexisting historic title which might
already have ripened because of past events but
which was called into question for the first time
in a domestic lawsuit.
Report at page 47.
The Master concludes that Nississippi Sound

~

a historic

bay because (1) the United States exercised authority over the
-..,.,._
'
Sound by the positions it took in international affairs, before
the Court and before Congress and by fortifying Ship Island and
patrolling the Sound, (2) the exercise was continuous from the
Louisiana Purchase in 1803 to 1971, and (3) foreign states
acquiesced in the exercise of authority as they knew or should
have known of the exercise and did not protest.
THE UNITED STATES' EXCEPTIONS:

The SG presents three major

arguments against the Master's conclusions.

They are:

(1)

Dauphin Island is not an extension of the mainland and does not
form a juridical bay; (2) even if Dauphin Island is properly
treated as an extension of the mainland, the whole Mississippi
Sound does not qualify as a juridical bay; and (3) the Sound is
not properly deemed an historic bay.

The SG suggests that the

Court need not give the Master's Report much deference because
the Master's errors are errors of law not fact.

The exceptions

- 10 do not argue disputed facts or the weight to be given evidence,
but the legal reasoning and conclusions drawn from the evidence.
The SG's first point is that even though Mobile Bay is a
juridical bay and thus inland water, it is still water and not
land.

Thus, the fact that Dauphin Island is on Mobile Bay does

not allow the island to be considered an extension of the
mainland.

The argument that inland water should be treated as

part of the mainland was made by Louisiana ten years ago in an
earlier phase of this case.

The same Special Master rejected

the argument in his Report and the Court rejected Louisiana's
exceptions.

420 U.S. 529 (1975).

The principle of equity of

treatment suggests that Alabama and Mississippi should not be
more generously treated than Louisiana.

Precedent aside, the

Master's approach is wrong because although a nation's
sovereignty extends to both the mainland and inland waters, the
Convention distinguishes between the two.

Thus, Article 7(3) of

the Convention--in applying the semi-circle and the 24-mile
rule--measures only the water gaps not the islands.

The

Master's approach allows for an unacceptable extension of
sovereignty because distant islands could relate back through
other islands to the waters of a bay and to the mainland.

The

SG suggests that "the Special Master's assimilation of inland
waters to land would, if accepted here, invite substantial
mischief in other cases."
The SG also argues that Dauphin Island, quite apart from
its relationship to Mobile Bay, may not be considered an
extension of the mainland.

The SG emphasizes the 1.6 mile wide

strait that separates Dauphin Island from the mainland and the

shape of the island.

The SG refers the Court to his arguments

against treating Long Island as an extension of the mainland in
No. 35 Original, United States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New
York), which is pending before the Court.
If Dauphin Island is an extension of the mainland, the
juridical bay thus created extends to the nearest headland on
the mainland (Point aux Cheres) and does not include the entire
Sound.

(see exhibit 1)

The SG argues that the Court has

determined that "Article 7 does not encompass bays formed in
part by islands which cannot realistically be considered part of
the mainland.''
omitted).

Lousiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 67 (footnote

The parties generally agree that the barrier island

cannot be deemed extensions of the mainland and the distance
from Isle au Pitre to Dauphin Island, excluding the islands,
exceeds 24 miles.
The SG admits that there is some evidence of treatment of
Mississippi Sound as inland water.

He argues, however, that the

Haster failed to give sufficient deference to the federal
government's disclaimer and failed to recognize that the
disclaimer required the States to present clear evidence that
historic title had already ripened because of past events.

The

SG notes that no state has met this burden of proof, although
California, Louisiana, Florida and Alaska have tried, and "there
is no warrant for singling out Mississippi Sound as a uniquely
stronger case."
The SG discounts the history of Mississippi Sound prior to
the admissions of Mississippi and Alabama to the Union.

He

notes that the prior sovereigns did not differentiate inland
from territorial jurisdiction.

Furthermore, upon their

admission to the Union, the states relinquished their colonial
claims, except as the United States chose to confirm them.
The SG finds the treatment of the Sound last century
inconclusive.

He notes that initial plans to fortify the Sound

were rejected on the ground that the Sound was too open to the
sea to be defensible.

Efforts were made to fortify Ship Island

but the fortification was never completed.

Furthermore, the

abandonment of the fort should be as significant as its
construction.

The SG also suggests that the military fort was

not designed "to impede peaceful vessels engaged in innocent
passage" and was not inconsistent with treating the Sound as
territorial waters rather than inland waters.
The SG suggests that this Court's opinion in Louisiana v.
Maryland, 202 U.S. 1, although it might be so read, does not
hold that the Sound is inland water.

He notes that United

States was not a party to the litigation and should not be
barred by it.

The United States in 1958 did state in a brief to

this Court that Louisiana v. Mississippi, supra, described the
Sound as inland water.

However, in litigation involving

Louisiana, the United States initially conceded certain areas to
Louisiana and then changed its position.

This Court held that

the United States was not bound by its initial position.
Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 73-74 n. 97.

Here, the

United States has never made an express concession.
The SG finds the remaining materials mentioned by the
Master to be less than compelling.

Some items such as the 1951

letter from the Acting Secretary of State have already been
rejected as inconclusive.
139, 163-165 (1965).

United States v. California, 381 U.S.

The most that can be said is that foreign

countries may have had the impression that the United States
favored a general formula for boundaries that would treat the
Sound as inland water.

The impression of a general policy is

not a specific claim and is far short of the type of "effective,
persistent and notorious exercise of inland jurisdiction" that
the states must demonstrate to overcome the United States'
present disclaimer.
MISSISSIPPI'S EXCEPTIONS:

Mississippi advances three

arguments as alternate bases for the conclusion that Mississippi
Sound is inland water.

The arguments are:

(1) judicial

deference to the United States' disclaimer of Article 4 straight
baselines is inappropriate in this case; (2) Mississippi Sound
qualifies as inland waters regardless of the treatment of
Dauphin Island as an extension of the mainland; and (3)
Mississippi's Act of Admission confirms the state's title to
Mississippi Sound.
Mississippi's first argument is premised on the Master's
finding that in ratifying the Geneva Convention, the United
States departed from its previously held position.

Prior to

ratification, the United States subscribed to the "ten-mile
rule" which provided that "waters enclosed between the mainland
and off-lying islands which were so closely grouped that no
entrance exceeded 10 nautical miles in width were deemed inland
waters."

Mississippi notes that in United States v. Louisiana,

394 U.S. 11 (1969) when the Court deferred to the federal
government's right to opt for straight baselines, the Court
talked about requiring the United States to take a "novel,
affirmative step of adding to its territory."

394 U.S. at 77.

- 14
Here the use of straight baselines is not novel and does not
enlarge the traditional international boundaries of the United
States.

The United States conceded Mississippi Sound to be

inland water over a quarter century ago and the waters have
become part of Mississippi's territory, protected by Article IV,
Section 3 and 4 of the United States Constitution.
Mississippi's second argument is that a careful analysis of
the Convention and the considerations behind its final language
leads to the conclusion that an arm of a bay may be composed of
a broken line of islands.

Mississippi concludes that the fringe

islands are such an arm and therefore the Sound is a juridical
bay even if Dauphin Island may not be considered an extension of
the mainland.
Finally, Mississippi argues that its Act of Admission
established Mississippi's boundary on the seaward side of the
barrier islands.

Mississippi recognized that in United States

v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 67-68, 81 (1960) this Court held that
the language of Louisiana's and Mississippi's acts of admission
"evidently contemplated no territorial sea whatever."
Mississippi distinguishes the case on the grounds that (a) the
states were attempting to extend their territories beyond the
three miles approved by the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1301
et. seq., and (b) all the islands on the coast of Louisiana were
within six miles of the mainland.

Mississippi notes that in the

Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. 11 (1969), when the Court
allowed the United States to withdraw its concessions to
Louisiana, the Court noted that Louisiana had not relied to its
detriment on the concessions.

394 U.S. 73 n. 97.

Should the

Court reject all the other grounds for finding Mississippi Sound
to be inland water, Mississippi requests a remand to the Master
to allow it to present evidence of detrimental reliance in the
United States' previous position.
ALABAMA'S EXCEPTIONS:
the Master's Report:

Alabama presents two exceptions to

(1) Alabama's Act of Admission, as

historically interpreted, establishes Alabama's historic land
boundary along the seaward side of Dauphin Island; and (2) if
Dauphin Island is an extension of the Alabama mainland but the
whole Mississippi Sound is not a juridical bay, the Court should
rule that there is a smaller jurisdictional bay with a mouth
located between the western end of Dauphin Island and Point Aux
Chenes on the mainland.
Alabama recognizes that pursuant to this Court's opinion in
United States v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 1 (1960) its Act of
Admission on its face does not cover the Mississippi Sound.
Alabama contends, however, that the Act, as historically
interpreted, extends Alabama's coastline to the seaward shore of
Dauphin Island.

Alabama notes that in Pollard's Lessee v.

Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845) this Court held that a state upon
admission to the Union owned the land beneath navigable inland
waters within their boundaries.

Furthermore, the rights

acquired upon admission vested on admission and are permanent.
See Oregon v. Corvallis, 429 U.S. 363 (1977).

Consequently, if

Alabama establishes an Act of Admission boundary on the seaward
side of Dauphin Island, the rights acquired on admission may not
be taken away.

Alabama argues that preadmission descriptions of

the area as well as post-admission interpretations all construed

Alabama's boundary to extend to Dauphin Island.
)

~

Alabama notes

that in Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906) this Court
described Mississippi Sound as inland water and lists some 18
incidents between 1940 and 1979 in which the federal government
represented Mississippi Sound as inland water.
Alabama has always maintained that its jurisdiction covers
the Sound and Dauphin Island.

Since at least 1929 Alabama has

enforced its criminal laws in the waters between the mainland
and Dauphin Island and around Dauphin Island.

See Basarge v.

State, 121 So. 427 (Ala. Cr. App. 1929) cert. denied, 121 So.2d
428 (Ala. 1929).

Since 1930 Alabama has entered into over 50

oil and gas leases in Mississippi Sound, many of which concern
the areas here in dispute.
Alabama's second position is the same as the United States'
fall-back position.

If Dauphin Island is an extension of

Alabama mainland, but the entire Mississippi Sound is not a
juridical bay, then the waters between Dauphin Island and the
mainland form a small juridical bay.
ALASKA'S POSITION AS AMICUS:

Alaska submitted a brief as

amicus curiae in opposition to the United States' exceRtions
because Alaska is litigating its boundaries with the United
States [United States v. Alaska, No. 84 Original].

Alaska's

brief contains five arguments:
(1)

when Alaska became a state, the official
position of the Unites States was to
assimilate "objectionable pockets" of
high sea to the territorial sea and
Alaska's Statehood Act defines its
territory to include territorial waters;

(2)

the Special Master's discussion of
straight baselines is unnecessary and
inadeguate and the Court should not make
a dec~sion on straight baselines until
the issue is fully developed in Alaska's
"AQA•

. ,.

(3)

both the language of the Submerged Lands
Act and the intent behind the Act give
the states all submerged lands between
their most seaward contiguous boundary and
the mainland, even if some of the submerged
lands are more than three mil~s from the
mainland or the barrier islands;

(4)

the Submerged Lands Act was an extension
of the equal footing doctrine to offshore
submerged lands and therefore Mississippi
and Alabama cannot be treated in a different
manner than Louisiana; and

(5)

the executive may not, without the approval of
Congress, renounce a state's claim to lands
within the state's boundaries.

DISCUSSION:

The increased value of submerged lands with

their oil and mineral deposits has resulted in the United States
taking the anomo~ position of arguing that there are pockets
of "high sea" within Missi'ssippi Sound that belong to the United
States even though they are surrounded by territorial waters
belonging to the states.

Because the Court has adopted the

provisions of the Geneva Convention as the proper basis upon
which to determine the coastal boundaries of the various states,
the Court's analysis of the Master's Report and the exceptions
will not only influence pending suits by other states (i.e.,
Alaska, New York, Massachusetts) but may affect United State's
foreign policy.
The only clear conclusion that can be drawn from the Report
and exceptions is that the exceptions merit oral argument.

The

issues raised are important and n·e ither the ?-1aster' s findings
nor the parties exceptions are so clearly correct as to merit
summary adoption.
The Master's conclusion that Dauphin Island may be treated
as an extension of the mainland may be questioned on two

grounds.

His decision that Nobile Bay, a juridical bay, may be

treated as land for determining Dauphin Island's relationship to
the mainland is unique.

The finding appears to be contrary to

the Master's previous rejection of the argument.

Furthermore,

if the Master's position were adopted, some restriction might be
necessary to limit the process of bays abutting islands which
create new bays which abut additional islands.
The question of when an island may be treated as an
extension of the mainland is presently before the Court in
No. 35 Original, United States v. Maine.

Whatever decision the

Court makes in that case may affect this case because:

(a) the

Court's discussion of assimilation of islands in United States
v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969) did not establish a clear test;
and (b) the Master did not indicate whether Dauphin Island
should be treated as an extension of the mainland, if Mobile Bay
was not considered land.
If Dauphin Island is considered an extension of the
mainland, the SG's argument that this creates only a small
juridical bay (from the western end of the island to Point
Chenes) may be well taken.

Article 7 does not encompass bays

formed by islands which cannot realistically be considered part
of the mainland.

However, an island may be included in a bay if

it lies in or near the mouth of the bay and gives the bay more
than one natural entrance.

The fringe islands may reasonably be

treated as either creating a juridical bay or giving an existing
bay multiple mouths.
The Master's finding that Mississippi Sound is a historic
bay may be more appealing because (a) the United States never

- 19 -

I

I "

contested the state's ownership of the Sound until the second

I

half of the twentieth century and (b) historic bays, by
definition, are unique.

Nonetheless, although the factual

finding may not influence many cases, the criteria adopted by
the Court will be used by other parties and may be cited against

-

~

-- ·--·----------

the United States in international cases.
~~~----~

The SG's exceptions to the finding that the Sound is an
historic bay may not be persuasive.

He admits that there is

evidence to support that conclusion (see page 23 of the United
States' exceptions) but suggests that the states 4 exercise of
jurisdiction was not sufficiently effective, persistent or
notorious.

This may be an impossible test.

How can a state

exercise inland jurisdiction in an effective, persistent and
notorious manner if from 1819 on no foreign country had any
reason to question that the Sound was within the United States
and the United States acceded to the states' exercise of
jurisdiction until 1971?
The strongest of the states' exceptions are variations of
the historic bay argument.

-

Mississippi suggests that the Court

should not defer to the United States' disclaimer of straight
baseline because the United States historically employed
straight baselines.

Similarly, Alabama's argument that its Act

of Admission, "as historically interpreted," extends states
jurisdiction over the Sound, is an attempt to balance history
against the United States' effort to change its position.
Of the remaining issues raised, one may merit mention.
Alaska argues that both the language of, and the intent behind,
r-"

I
I

.._.r

the Submerged Lands Act grants Alabama and Mississippi all the

submerged lands landward of their most seaward contiguous
boundaries.

Alaska's argument is well made, does not appear to

be precluded by the Court's prior opinions (see United States v.
Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (196) limiting "each coastal state's
seaward boundary at three geographical miles"), and is not
really addressed by the Master or the United States.

If this

argument bears scrutiny, the Court may wish to invite further
briefs.
CONCLUSION:

Because the exceptions raise important

unsettled issues that have national and international
ramifications, the exceptions should be scheduled for oral
argument.

Argument should be held in tandem with argument in

No. 35 Original, United States v. Haine, because .....__
both cases
~ise

~he

issue of whether an island may be considered an

extension of the mainland.
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United States v. Louisiana et al
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fu establish certain waters as "b~storic (!)~ " it is

necessary to show that the coastal state has

--

~

~ ~!.:...

.

traditionally ~~

asserted and maintained dominion over the waters in question with
~..________

fue acquiescence of foreign states.
381

u.s.

139, 172 (1965).

United States v. California,

The Special Master cited persuasive

evidence for his conclusion that Mississippi Sound represents
{\,

historic inland waters.

(

T4--

]/I

•

Y~ ~ ~

II

j
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)

•

I

~
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~~~
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Perhaps most telling is the fact that every nation that
exercised sovereignty over the surrounding mainland and islands
~s

considered the Sound to be part of its possession.

For

example, after the Louisiana Purchase, Congress authorized the
~esident

to take possession of "all navigable waters, rivers,

creeks, bays, and inlets lying within the United States, which
empty into the Gulf of Mexico east of the River Mississippi."
Spain
___..... disputed the United States' authority over the eastern part
of these waters, but acquiesced by Treaty in 1819.
In the 1800s, a number of Congressional documents indicate
that Congress thought that the Sound represented inland waters of

---------.,.

c.---

the United States. The Special Master cited three Senate reports
discussing the necessity and possibility of defending these
waters.

By 1847 Ship Island was reserved for military use.

In

1857 Congress authorized the construction of a fort and

·'

In 1861, Union troops

construction began the next year.

destroyed the fort to prevent it from failing into Confederate
hands.

The fort changed hands several times during the War and

sometime afterwards was abandoned.
~idence,

It nevertheless is strong

I think, of the United States' claim that the waters

north of Ship Island were its own.
The acts admitting Mississippi and Alabama to the Union define
their boundaries as extending to the Gulf of Mexico, and then,
respectively, westerly and easterly, "including all islands
within six miles of the shore."
~at

this lauguage establishes the southern coast of the barrier

~lands
~

Mississippi and Alabama argue

as their southern boundaries.

Mississippi, 202

u.s.

1,

Additionally, in Louisiana

(1905), this Court spoke of

Mississippi Sound as "an enclosed arm of the sea, wholly within
the United States • • • • " The brief of Alabama also cites
numerous examples from the past fifty years of the United States'
(See pp. 15 - 20.)

claim that Mississippi Sound is inland waters.

I think that the foregoing show that the run ited States \ has
traditionally asserted and maintained dominion over the waters of
Miss1Ss1ppi Sound sufficient to establish the first element of

the States' claim that the water is an f istoric

~Yj---

It is a bit more difficult to cite direct evidence that
foreign states acquiesced in this claim.

The 1819 Treaty with

spain is the only example cited to the Court.

As Alabama points

out, however, the reason it hasn't had to exclude foreign fishing
trawlers, for example, is because the Sound is too shallow for
all but the "shallowest draft coastal vessels and barges."

.v

In

United States v. Alaska, 422

u.s.

184, 200 (1975}, the Court

noted a U.N. study which concluded that a State need not
necessarily have undertaken "concrete action to enforce its
relevant laws and regulations" in the area claimed as an historic
bay, if its laws and regulations were respected.

Rather, it is

essential that a State act to the extent necessary to maintain
its authority over the area.

There is no claim here that the

coastal nation has failed to enforce its authority in the face of
disrespect by foreign nations.

Thus, I think the Special Master

correctly concluded that both of the components of the historic
bay test were satisfied.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.9 Orig.

UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA ET AL. (ALABAMA
AND MISSISSIPPI BOUNDARY CASE)
ON EXCEPTIONS TO REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER
[February -

, 1985]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is the latest chapter in the long-lasting litigation between the Federal Government and the States of the Gulf
Coast concerning ownership of the seabed, minerals, and
other natural resources underlying the Gulf of Mexico. The
particular and narrow issue presented here is whether the
waters of Mississippi Sound are inland waters. If the Sound
constitutes inland waters, as the States of Alabama and Mississippi contend, then these States own the lands submerged
under the Sound. If the Sound in substantial part does not
constitute inland waters, as the Government contends, then
the United States owns the lands submerged under several
"enclaves" of high seas within the Sound. We conclude that
Mississippi Sound qualifies as a historic bay, and that the
waters of the Sound, therefore, are inland waters. '
I
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C.
§ 1301 et seq., confirms to each State title to and ownership of
the lands beneath navigable waters within the State's boundaries. § 1311(a). The Act also confirms in each coastal
State a seaward boundary three geographical miles distant
from its coastline. § 1312. A State bordering on the Gulf
of Mexico, however, may be entitled to a historic seaward
boundary beyond three geographical miles and up to three
marine leagues (approximately nine geographical miles) dis-
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tant from its coastline. §§ 1301(b), 1312. The Act defines
the term "coast line" as "the line of ordinary low water along
that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the
open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland
waters." § 1301(c). The first part of this definition is relatively easy to apply. The second part-requiring determination of "the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters"-is more difficult to apply because the term "inland
waters" is not defined in the Act.
In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1 (1960), this
Court determined, among other things, that the States of
Alabama and Mississippi are not entitled under the Submerged Lands Act to a historic seaward boundary three marine leagues distant from their coastlines. Rather, the
Court held, these two States are entitled, as against the
United States, to all the lands, minerals, and other natural
resources underlying the Gulf of Mexico, extending seaward
from their coastlines for a distance of no more than three
geographical miles. ld., at 79-82, 83 (opinion); United
States v. Louisiana, 364 U. S. 502, 503 (1960) (decree). The
Court, however, did not express any opinion as to the precise
location of the coastline from which the three-mile belt is to
be measured. 363 U. S., at 82, nn. 135 and 139. The Court
merely noted, in accordance with the above-mentioned definition in §2(c) of the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U. S. C.
§ 1301(c), that "the term 'coast line' means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters." 364 U. S., at 503. See also
363 U. S., at 83. The Court retained jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings, including proceedings to resolve
any dispute in locating the relevant coastline. Ibid.; 364
U. S., at 504.
As has been noted, locating the coastline requires the determination of the seaward limit of "inland waters." Follow-
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ing the Court's decision in United States v. Louisiana, a disagreement arose between the United States and the States of
Alabama and Mississippi concerning the status of Mississippi
Sound as inland waters. The Sound is a body of water immediately south of the mainland of the two States. It extends
from Lake Borgne at the west to Mobile Bay at the east, and
is bounded on the south by a line of barrier islands. These
islands, from west to east, are Isle au Pitre, Cat Island, Ship
Island, Horn Island, Petit Bois Island, and Dauphin Island.
The Sound is approximately 80 miles long and 10 miles wide.
The two States contend that the whole of Mississippi
Sound constitutes "inland waters." Under this view, the
coastline of the States consists of the lines of ordinary low
water along the southern coasts of the barrier islands together with appropriate lines connecting the barrier islands.
These latter lines mark the seaward limit of Mississippi
Sound. The United States, on the other hand, denies the inland water status of Mississippi Sound. Under its view, the
coastline of the States generally consists of the lines of ordinary low water along the southern mainland and around each
of the barrier islands. 1
The United States' position actually is somewhat more complicated.
First, the United States concedes that Isle au Pitre may be treated as part
of the mainland, and that a bay closing line may be drawn from the eastern
tip of Isle au Pitre to the eastern promontory of St. Louis Bay on the mainland. Thus, the waters of Mississippi Sound west of this bay-closing line
are inland waters, and the bay-closing line forms part of the legal coastline
of Mississippi. Second, the United States takes the position that if Dauphin Island at Mobile Bay is properly treated as part of the mainlandwhich the United States disputes-then a bay closing line may be drawn
from the western tip of Dauphin Island northwesterly to Point Aux Chenes
on the mainland, just west of the Alabama-Mississippi boundary. Under
this secondary or fall-back position of the United States, the waters of Mississippi Sound east of this bay-closing line are inland waters, and the bayclosing line forms part of the legal coastline of Alabama and Mississippi.
Finally, there are several undisputed inland rivers and bays along the
shores of Alabama and Mississippi, and, as a consequence, undisputed clos1
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Under the States' view, then, the States own all the lands
underlying Mississippi Sound, as well as the lands underlying
the Gulf of Mexico extending seaward for a distance of three
geographical miles from the southern coasts of the barrier
islands and the lines connecting those islands. Under the
United States' view, on the other hand, the States own only
those lands underlying Mississippi Sound and the Gulf of
Mexico that are within three geographical miles of the mainland ·coast or of the coasts of the barrier islands. There are
several areas within Mississippi Sound that are more than
three miles from any point on these coasts. Under the
United States' view, those areas constitute "enclaves" or
pockets of high seas, and the lands underlying them belong to
the United States.
To resolve this dispute over the inland-water status of Mississippi Sound, the two States and the United States filed
motions and cross-motions for the entry of a supplemental
decree. The Court referred these pleadings to its Special
Master, the Honorable Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., who already had been appointed in United States v. Louisiana
(Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U. S. 11 (1969). See 444
U. S. 1064 (1980); 445 U. S. 923 (1980). See also 457 U. S.
1115 (1982). Following extended proceedings, the Special
Master has submitted his Report to this Court.
II

As noted above, the Submerged Lands Act employs but
does not define the term "inland waters." In United States
v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 161-167 (1965), this Court observed that Congress had left to the Court the task of defining "inland waters" for purposes of the Submerged Lands
Act. The Court for those purposes has adopted the definitions provided in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U. S. T. (pt. 2) 1607,
ing lines across the mouths of these rivers and bays that, in the Government's view, form part of the legal coastline of the States.
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T. I. A. S. No. 5639 (the Convention). 381 U. S., at 165.
See also Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 35; United
States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary
Case), ante, at-- (slip op. 8-9).
The Convention, however, uses terminology differing
somewhat from the terminology of the Submerged Lands
Act. In particular, the Convention uses the term "baseline"
to refer to the "coast line," and it uses the term "territorial
sea" to refer to the three-geographical-mile belt extending
seaward from the coastline. The territorial sea is one of the
three zones into which, in international law, the sea is divided. The Court so explained in the Louisiana Boundary
Case:
"Under generally accepted principles of international
law, the navigable sea is divided into three zones, distinguished by the nature of the control which the contiguous nation can exercise over them. Nearest to the nation's shores are its inland, or internal waters. These
are subject to the complete sovereignty of the nation, as
much as if they were a part of its land territory, and the
coastal nation has the privilege even to exclude foreign
vessels altogether. Beyond the inland waters, and
measured from their seaward edge, is a belt known as
the marginal, or territorial, sea. Within it the coastal
nation may exercise extensive control but cannot deny
the right of innocent passage to foreign nations. Outside the territorial sea are the high seas, which are international waters not subject to the dominion of any single
nation." 394 U. S., at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
Article 3 of the Convention provides the general rule for
determining the "baseline":
"Except where otherwise provided in these articles,
the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as
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marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the
coastal State."
The Convention, however, provides several exceptions to the
general rule pursuant to which Mississippi Sound might qualify as inland waters.
First, Article 4 of the Convention permits a nation to employ the method of straight baselines in delimiting its coastline. Article 4(1) provides in pertinent part:
"In localities where the coast line is deeply indented
and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the
coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in
drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
If the method of straight baselines were applied to the coast
of Alabama and Mississippi, the coastline would be drawn by
connecting the barrier islands, thus enclosing Mississippi
Sound as inland waters. The Court has held, however, that
the method of straight baselines is applicable only if the
Federal Government has chosen to adopt it. See Louisiana
Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 72-73; United States v. California, 381 U. S., at 167-169. In the present case, the Special Master concluded that the United States has not adopted
the straight baseline method.
Second, Article 7 of the Convention provides a set of rules
for determining whether a body of water qualifies as inland
waters because it is a "juridical bay." Under Article 7(2),
such a bay is defined to be "a well-marked indentation whose
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as
to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere
curvature of the coast." In addition, the area of the indentation must be "as large as, or larger than, that of the semicircle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that
indentation." And the closing line of the bay must not exceed 24 miles. The Special Master concluded that Missis-
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sippi Sound satisfies these criteria and thus qualifies as a
juridical bay. In reaching this conclusion, the Master determined that Dauphin Island was to be treated as part of the
mainland. The closing line drawn from the easternmost
point of Isle au Pitre to the westernmost point of Dauphin
Island, connecting each of the intervening barrier islands,
crosses water gaps totaling less than 24 miles in length.
Finally, Article 7(6) of the Convention indicates that a
body of water can qualify as inland waters if it is a "historic
bay." The Convention does not define the term "historic
bay." The Special Master concluded that Mississippi Sound
qualifies as a historic bay under the tests noted in United
States v. California, 381 U. S., at 172, and United States v.
Alaska, 422 U. S. 184, 189 (1975).
The Special Master, accordingly, recommended to this
Court that a decree be entered in favor of Alabama and
Mississippi.
The United States and the States of Alabama and Mississippi respectively filed exceptions to the Master's Report.
The United States argued that the Master erred in concluding that Mississippi Sound is both a juridical bay and a
historic bay; it claims that it is neither. Alabama and Mississippi agreed with those conclusions of the Special Master, but
argued that there also were alternative grounds for concluding that Mississippi Sound constitutes inland waters. In
particular, the States argued that their Acts of Admission
established their boundaries along the southern coast of the
barrier islands; that Mississippi Sound qualifies as inland
waters under the straight baseline method of Article 4 of the
Convention and prior United States practice; that Mississippi
Sound qualifies as a juridical bay regardless of the characterization of Dauphin Island as a "mainland headland;" and
that even if the whole of Mississippi Sound is not a juridical
bay, a smaller juridical bay exists at the eastern end of the
Sound.
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We have independently reviewed the record, as we must.
See Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U. S. 289, 291-292, 294
(1974); Colorado v. New Mexico,-- U.S.--,-- (1984)
(slip op. 6); Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case,
ante, at--, (slip op. 1). Upon that review, we conclude
that the Special Master correctly determined that Mississippi
Sound is a historic bay. We therefore need not, and do not,
address the exceptions presented by the States of Alabama
and Mississippi or those exceptions of the United States that
relate to the question whether Mississippi Sound qualifies as
a juridical bay under Article 7 of the Convention.

III
The term "historic bay" is not defined in the Convention
and there is no complete accord as to its meaning. The
Court has stated that a historic bay is a bay "over which a
coastal nation has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations." United
States v. California, 381 U. S., at 172. See also United
States v. Alaska, 422 U. S., at 189; Louisiana Boundary
Case, 394 U. S., at 23. The Court also has noted that there
appears to be general agreement that at least three factors
are to be taken into consideration in determining whether a
body of water is a historic bay: (1) the exercise of authority
over the area by the claiming nation; (2) the continuity of this
exercise of authority; and (3) the acquiescence of foreign
nations. See United States v. Alaska, 422 U. S., at 189;
Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 23-24, n. 27. An
authoritative United Nations study concludes that these
2

2
In this opinion, the tenn "historic bay'' is used interchangeably with
the tenn "historic inland waters." It is clear that a historic bay need not
confonn to the geographic tests for a juridical bay set forth in Article 7 of
the Convention. See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S. 11, 75, n. 100
(1969). In this case, as in that one, we need not decide how unlike a juridical bay a body of water can be and still qualify as a historic bay, for it
is clear from the Special Master's Report that, at minimum, Mississippi
Sound closely resembles a juridical bay.
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three factors require that "the coastal State must have effectively exercised sovereignty over the area continuously during a time sufficient to create a usage and have done so under
the general toleration of the community of States." Juridical
Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays 56,
U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 (1962) (hereinafter Juridical Regime). 3 In addition, there is substantial agreement that a
fourth factor to be taken into consideration is the vital interests of the coastal nation, including elements such as geographical configuration, economic interests, and the requirements of self-defense. See Juridical Regime, at 38, 56-58; 1
A. Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries 48-49 (1962). See
also Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I. C. J. 116, 142.
In the present case, the facts establish that the United States
effectively has exercised sovereignty over Mississippi Sound
as inland waters from the time of the Louisiana Purchase in
1803 until 1971, and has done so without protest by foreign
nations.
A
Mississippi Sound historically has been an intracoastal waterway of commercial and strategic importance to the United
States. Conversely, it has been of little significance to foreign nations. The Sound is shallow, ranging in depth generally from 1 to 18 feet except for artificially maintained channels between Cat Island and Ship Island leading to Gulfport,
Miss., and between Horn Island and Petit Bois Island leading
to Pascagoula, Miss. Outside those channels, it is not
readily navigable for ocean-going vessels. Furthermore, it
is a cul de sac, and there is no reason for an ocean-going vessel to enter the Sound except to reach the Gulf ports. The
historic importance of Mississippi Sound to vital interests of
3
The study explains that "no precise length of time can be indicated as
necessary to build the usage on which the historic title must be based. It
must remain a matter of judgement when sufficient time has elapsed for
the usage to emerge." Juridical Regime, at 45. See also 1 A. Shalowitz,
Shore and Sea Boundaries 49 (1962) (hereinafter Shalowitz).
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the United States, and the corresponding insignificance of
the Sound to the interests of foreign nations, lend support to
the view that Mississippi Sound constitutes inland waters. 4
Throughout most of the 19th century, the United States
openly recognized Mississippi Sound as an inland waterway
of importance for commerce, communications, !lnd defense.
Early in this period the Nation took steps to enhance and protect its interests in the Sound. On February 8, 1817, the
House of Representatives listed among objects of national
importance several "improvements requisite to afford the advantages of internal navigation and intercourse throughout
the United States and its Territories," including "as a more
distant object, a canal communication, if practicable, from the
Altamaha and its waters to Mobile, and from thence to the
Mississippi." H. R. Doc. No. 427, 14th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1817), reprinted in 2 American State Papers 420, 422 (1834).
This project ultimately became the Intracoastal Waterway
thr~ugh Mississippi Sound.
On February 28, 1822, the
House Committee on Military Affairs issued a report that
recognized the importance of the intracoastal communication
between New Orleans and Mobile Bay through what an 1820
letter reprinted in the report described as "the little interior
sea, comprised between the main and the chain of islands,
bounded by Cat Island to the west, and Dauphin Island to the
east." H. R. Rep. No. 51, 17th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1823).
Defense of this important waterway has been a longstanding concern of the United States. On April 20, 1836, the
'United States Attorney General Edmund Randolph long ago employed
similar reasoning in his opinion that Delaware Bay constitutes inland
waters:
"These remarks may be enforced by asking, What nation can be injured
in its rights by the Delaware being appropriated to the United States?
And to what degree may not the United States be injured, on the contrary
ground? It communicates with no foreign dominion; no foreign nation has
ever before had a community of right in it, as if it were a main sea; under
the former and present governments, the exclusive jurisdiction has been
asserted. " 1 Op. Atty Gen. 32, 37 (1793).
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Senate passed a resolution calling upon the Secretary of War
to survey the most eligible sites for a fortification suitable for
the defense of Mississippi Sound and the commerce along it.
See S. Rep. No. 490, 26th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1840). A subsequent resolution instructed the Senate Committee on Military Affairs to study the expediency of erecting a fort on the
western extremity of Ship Island. See S. Rep. No. 618, 26th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1840). In response to an inquiry pursuant to this resolution, the War Department noted: "The defenses indicated would cover one of the channels leading from
the gulf into the broad interior water communication extending from Lake Borgne to the bay of Mobile." I d., at 2. 5
Ship Island was reserved for military purposes by an executive order of August 30, 1847. In 1858, the War Department, responsive to an appropriation made by Congress, see
the Act of Mar. 3. 1857, 11 Stat. 191, 192, authorized the
building of a fort on.the island. It was to be constructed at
the island's west end, and to command the pass into Mississippi Sound between Ship and Cat Islands. Forty-eight cannons were ordered to arm the fort. During the War Between the States, the fort was occupied alternately by Union
and Confederate troops. It was finally abandoned in 1875.
Ten years later, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs noted:
"The broad sheet of water which lies between the coast of Mississippi
and the chain of islands parallel to it, is the channel of a commerce important in peace and indispensable in war. Through this passes the inland
navigation which connects New Orleans and Mobile. This is the route of
the mails and of a large part of the travel between the eastern and southwestern sections of the Union. Through this channel supplies for the
naval station at Pensacola are most readily drawn from the great storehouse, the valley of the Mississippi, and its importance in this respect
would be increased in a two-fold degree by the contingency of a maritime
war: first, because a war would increase the requisite amount of supplies at
that station; and, secondly, because it would greatly augment the difficulties of the more extended and exposed lines of communication by exterior
navigation." S. Rep. No. 23, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1850).
6
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In 1879, the United States erected a lighthouse on the central
section of the island. 6
The United States argues that this official recognition of
Mississippi Sound as an internal waterway of commercial and
strategic importance has no relevance to the Sound's status
as a historic bay. ~t would support this argument with a
citation to the 1962 United Nations study of historic waters.
Juridical Regime, at 56-58. The cited pages of the study discuss the view taken by some authors and governments that
such circumstances as geographic configuration, requirements of self-defense, or other vital interests of the coastal
state may justify a claim to historic bay status without the
necessity of establishing long usage. The study notes, id.,
at 58, that "[t]here is undoubtedly some justification for this
view," but ultimately suggests that it does not make sense
for "historic title" to be claimed in circumstances where the
historic element is wholly absent. Ibid. The study, however, does not suggest that such circumstances as geographic
configuration and vital interests are irrelevant to the question whether a body of water is a historic bay and, indeed, it
affirmatively indicates that such circumstances can fortify a
claim to "historic bay'' status that is based on usage. 7
6

See, generally, Report of the Special Master 38; Caraway, The Story
of Ship Island, 1699-1941, 4 J. Miss. Hist. 76 (1942); Weinert, The Neglected Key to the Gulf Coast, 31 J. Miss. Hist. 269 (1969).
The United States argues that the fortification of Ship Island is relevant
only to the United States' suppression of its civil insurrection. But the
fort was planned and construction was begun years before the outbreak of
the Civil War, and it was not abandoned until some years after the conclusion of that War. The United States further argues that the abandonment
of the fort suggests a retreat from any claim of inland water status for Mississippi Sound. But it seems just as likely, and perhaps more likely, that
the fort eventually was abandoned because foreign nations completely acquiesced in the United States' assertion of sovereignty over the Sound,
rendering the fort unnecessary.
7
The study cites Bourquin as a proponent of the view that "[t]he character of a bay depends on a combination of geographical, political, economic, historical and other circumstances." Juridical Regime, at 25

,.
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In any event, the evidence discussed above does not
merely demonstrate that Mississippi Sound is presently important to vital interests of the United States. Rather, the
evidence demonstrates that the United States historically
and expressly has recognized Mississippi Sound as an important internal waterway and has exercised sovereignty over
the Sound on that basis throughout much of the 19th century.
B
The United States continued openly to assert the inland
water status of Mississippi Sound throughout the 20th century until1971. Prior to its ratification of the Convention on
March 24, 1961, 8 the United States had adopted a policy of
enclosing as inland waters those areas between the mainland
and offlying islands that were so closely grouped that no entrance exceeded 10 geographical miles. 9 This 10-mile rule
represented the publicly stated policy of the United States at
least since the time of the Alaska Boundary Arbitration in
1903. There is no doubt that foreign nations were aware
(translating and quoting Bourquin, Les Baies Historiques, in Melanges
Georges Sauser-Hall 42 (1952)). Bourquin explains:
''Where long usage is invoked by a State, it is a ground additional to the
other grounds on which its claim is based. In justification of its claim, it
will be able to point not only to the configuration of the bay, to the bay's
economic importance to it, to its need to control the bay in order to protect
its territory, etc., but also to the fact that its acts with respect to the bay
have always been those of the sovereign and that its rights are thus confinned by historical tradition." Juridical Regime, at 25-26.
8
The Convention did not go into effect, however, until September 10,
1964, when the requisite number of nations had ratified it.
9
The United States confinned this policy in a number of offi~ial communications during the period from 1951 to 1961. See Report of the Special
Master 48-54. Also, the United States followed this policy in drawing the
Chapman line along the Louisiana coast following the decision in United
States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699 (1950). See Shalowitz, at 161. In a
letter to Governor Wright of Mississippi, written on October 17, 1951,
Oscar L. Chapman, then Secretary of the Interior, indicated that if the
Chapman line were extended eastward beyond the Louisiana border, it
would enclose Mississippi Sound as inland waters.
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that the United States had adopted this policy. Indeed, the
United States' policy was cited and discussed at length by
both the United Kingdom and Norway in the celebrated
Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), supra. 10 Nor is there any
doubt, under the stipulations of the parties in this case, that
Mississippi Sound constituted inland waters under that view.
The United States contends that its earlier adoption of and
adherence to a general formulation of coastline delimitation
under which Mississippi Sound would have qualified as inland
waters is not a sufficiently specific claim to the Sound as inland waters to establish it as a historic bay. In the present
case, however, the general principles in fact were coupled
with specific assertions of the status of the Sound as inland
waters. The earliest such assertion in the 20th century occurred in Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1 (1906). In
that case, the Court determined the location of the boundary
between Louisiana and Mississippi in the waters of Lake
Borgne and Mississippi Sound. The Court described the
Sound as "an inclosed arm of the sea, wholly within the
United States, and formed by a chain of large islands, extending westward from Mobile, Alabama, to Cat Island.
The openings from this body of water into the Gulf are neither of them six miles wide." I d., at 48. The Court ruled
that the doctrine of "thalweg" was applicable to determine
the exact location of the boundary separating Louisiana from
Mississippi in Lake Borgne and Mississippi Sound. Under
that doctrine, the water boundary between States is defined
as the middle of the deepest or most navigable channel, as
distinguished from the geographic center or a line midway
between the banks. See Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U. S. 702,
709-710 (1973); Louisiana v. Mississippi, - - U. S. - - ,
10
It is noteworthy that in the Fisheries Case, the International Court of
Justice ruled that the consistent and prolonged application of the Norwegian system of delimiting inland waters, combined with the general toleration of foreign states, gave rise to a historic right to apply the system.
See 1951 I. C. J., at 138-139.
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- - (1984) (slip op. 3-5). The Court concluded that the
"principle of thalweg is applicable," not only to navigable
rivers, but also to "sounds, bays, straits, gulfs, estuaries and
other arms of the sea." 202 U. S., at 50. The Court rejected the contention that the doctrine did not apply in Lake
Borgne and Mississippi Sound because those bodies were
"open sea." Id., at 51-52. The Court noted that the record
showed that Lake Borgne and the relevant part of Mississippi Sound is not open sea but "a very shallow arm of the
sea, having outside of the deep water channel an inconsiderable depth." I d., at 52. The Court clearly treated Mississippi Sound as inland waters, under the category of "bays
wholly within [the Nation's] territory not exceeding two marine leagues in width at the mouth." Ibid.
The United States argues that the language in Louisiana
v. Mississippi does not constitute a holding that Mississippi
Sound is inland waters. It appears to us, however, that the
Court's conclusion that the Sound was inland waters was essential to its ruling that the doctrine of thalweg was applicable. The United States also argues that it cannot be
bound by the holding because it was not a party in that case.
The significance of the holding for the present case, however,
is not its effect as precedent in domestic law, but rather its
effect on foreign nations that would be put on notice by the
decision that the United States considered Mississippi Sound
to be inland waters.
If foreign nations retained any doubt after Louisiana v.
Mississippi that the official policy of the United States was
to recognize Mississippi Sound as inland waters, that doubt
must have been eliminated by the unequivocal declaration of
the inland water status of Mississippi Sound by the United
States in an earlier phase of this very litigation. 11 In a brief
11
The United States also acknowledged that Mississippi Sound constitutes inland waters in a letter written by the Secretary of the Interior to
the Governor of Mississippi on October 17, 1951, confinning that the oil and

?~
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filed with this Court on May 15, 1958, the United States
noted:
"[W]e need not consider whether the language, 'including the islands' etc., would of itself include the water
area intervening between the islands and the mainland
(though we believe it would not), because it happens that
all the water so situated in Mississippi is in Mississippi
Sound, which this Court has described as inland water.
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 48. The bed of
these inland waters passed to the State on its entry into
the Union. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212."
Brief for United States in Support of Motion for Judgment on Amended Complaint in United States v. Louisiana, 0. T. 1958, No. 10 Original, p. 254. 12
Similarly, in discussing Alabama's entitlement to submerged
lands, the United States conceded that "the water between
the islands and the Alabama mainland is inland water; consequently, we do not question that the land under it belongs to
the State." I d., at 261.
The United States argues that the States cannot now invoke estoppel based on the Federal Government's earlier
construction of Louisiana v. Mississippi as describing Mississippi Sound as inland water. The United States points
out that the Court in the Louisiana Boundary Case, 394
U. S., at 73-74, n. 97, concluded that a similar concession
with respect to Louisiana was not binding on the United
States. As with the Court's holding in 1906 in Louisiana v.
Mississippi, however, the significance of the United States'
concession in 1958 is not that it has binding effect in domestic
law, but that it represents a public acknowledgment of the
gas leasing rights inside the barrier islands belonged to the State of Mississippi. Report of the Special Master 42-44.
12
In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1 (1960), Alabama and Mississippi argued that language in their Acts of Admission and in other historic documents entitled them to ownership of all submerged lands located
within three marine leagues of their coastlines. See id., at 79-82.
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official view that Mississippi Sound constitutes inland waters
of the nation.

c

In addition to showing continuous exercise of authority
over Mississippi Sound as inland waters, the States must
show that foreign nations acquiesced in, or tolerated, this
exercise. It is uncontested that no foreign government has
ever protested the United States' claim to Mississippi·Sound
as inland waters. This is not surprising in light of the geography of the coast, the shallowness of the waters, and the absence of international shipping lanes in the vicinity. Scholarly comment is divided over whether the mere absence of
opposition suffices to establish title. See United States v.
Alaska, 422 U. S., at 189, n. 8, 199-200; Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 23-24, n. 27. In United States v.
Alaska, this Court held that, under the circumstances of that
case, mere failure to object was insufficient because it had
not been shown that foreign governments knew or reasonably should have known of the authority being asserted.
There is substantial agreement that when foreign governments do know or have reason to know of the effective and
continual exercise of sovereignty over a maritime area, inaction or toleration on the part of the foreign governments is
sufficient to permit a historic title to arise. See Juridical Regime, at 48-49. See also Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.),
1951 I. C. J., at 138-139. Moreover, it is necessary to prove
only open and public exercise of sovereignty, not actual
knowledge by the foreign governments. See Juridical Regime, at 54-55. In the present case, the United States publicly and unequivocally stated that it considered Mississippi
Sound to be inland waters. We conclude that under these
circumstances the failure of foreign governments to protest is
sufficient proof of the acquiescence or toleration necessary to
historic title.
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IV
The United States contends that, notwithstanding the substantial evidence discussed above of the Government's assertion of sovereignty over Mississippi Sound as inland water,
the States have failed to satisfy their burden of proof that
Mississippi Sound is a historic bay. The United States relies
on its recent disclaimer of the inland-water status of the
Sound and on the absence of any evidence of actual exclusion
from the Sound of foreign navigation in innocent passage.
We find neither of these points persuasive.
A

In April1971, the United States for the first time publicly
disclaimed the inland-water status of Mississippi Sound by
publishing a set of maps delineating the three-mile territorial
sea and certain inland waters of the United States. These
maps, which include the entire Gulf Coast, have been distributed to foreign governments in response to requests made
upon the Department of State for documents delimiting the
boundaries of the United States.
This Court repeatedly has made clear that the United
States' disclaimer of historic inland water status will not
invariably be given decisive weight. In United States v.
California, 381 U. S., at 175, the Court gave decisive effect
to a disclaimer of historic inland water status by the United
States only because the case involved "questionable evidence
of continuous and exclusive assertions of dominion over the
disputed waters." The Court suggested, however, that such
a disclaimer would not be decisive in a case in which the historic evidence was "clear beyond doubt." Ibid. The Court
also suggested that "a contraction of a State's recognized
territory imposed by the Federal Government in the name of
foreign policy would be highly questionable." I d., at 168.
See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267 (1890). The Court
reiterated this latter theme in the Louisiana Boundary
Case, where it stated:

.'

No. 9 Orig.-OPINION
ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI BOUNDARY CASE

19

"It is one thing to say that the United States should
not be required to take the novel, affirmative step of
adding to its territory by drawing straight baselines. It
would be quite another to allow the United States to prevent recognition of a historic title which may already
have ripened because of past events but which is called
into question for the first time in a domestic lawsuit.
The latter, we believe, would approach an impermissible
contraction of territory against which we cautioned in
United States v. California." 394 U. S., at 77, n. 104
(emphasis in original).
The maps constituting the disclaimer in the present case
were published more than two years after the decree in the
Louisiana Boundary Case, and 11 years after the decision in
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1 (1960). The Special
Master concluded that "under the circumstances it is difficult
to accept the disclaimer as entirely extrajudicial in its motivation." Report of the Special Master 47. Rather, according to the Master, the disclaimer "would appear to be more in
the nature of an attempt by the United States to prevent recognition of any pre-existing historic title which might already
have ripened because of past events but which was called into
question for the first time in a domestic lawsuit." Ibid.
We conclude that historic title to Mississippi Sound as inland waters had ripened prior to the United States' ratification of the Convention in 1961 and prior to its disclaimer of
the inland-waters status of the Sound in 1971. That disclaimer, issued while the Court retained jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning the location of the coastline of the
Gulf Coast States, is insufficient to divest the States of their
entitlement to the submerged lands under Mississippi Sound.
B
Finally, the United States argues that proof of historic inland water status requires a showing that sovereignty was
exerted to exclude from the area all foreign navigation in in-
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nocent passage. This argument is based on the principle
that a coastal nation has the privilege to exclude innocentpassage foreign navigation from its inland waters, but not
from its territorial sea. See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394
U. S., at 22. According to the United States, such exclusion
is therefore the only conduct that conclusively demonstrates
that the nation exercises authority over the waters in question as inland waters and not merely as territorial sea.
This rigid view of the requirements for establishing historic inland-water status is unrealistic and is supported neither by the Court's precedents 13 nor by writers on international law. 14 To the contrary, in advocating a flexible
approach to appraisal of the factors necessary to a valid claim
of historic inland-waters status, two leading commentators
have stated: "A relatively relaxed interpretation of the evidence of historic assertion and of the general acquiescence of
other states seems more consonant with the frequently amor13
In United States v. Alaska, 422 U. S. 184, 197 (1975), the Court noted
that to establish historic title to a body of water as inland waters, "the exercise of authority must have been, historically, an assertion of power to
exclude all foreign vessels and navigation." It is clear, however, that a
nation can assert power to exclude foreign navigation in ways other than
by actual resort to the use of that power in specific instances.
14
One prominent writer has explained the "actes d'appropriation" necessary to establish effective exercise of sovereignty as follows:
"It is hard to specify categorically what kind of acts of appropriation constitute sufficient evidence: the exclusion from these areas of foreign vessels
or their subjection to rules imposed by the coastal State which exceed the
normal scope of regulation made in the interests of navigation would obviously be acts affording convincing evidence of the State's intent. It would,
however, be too strict to insist that only such acts constitute evidence. In
the Grisbadarna dispute between Sweden and Norway, the judgement of
23 October 1909 mentions that 'Sweden has performed various acts . . .
owing to her conviction that these regions were Swedish, as, for instance,
the placing of beacons, the measurement of the sea, and the installation of a
light-boat, being acts which involved considerable expense and in doing
which she not only thought that she was exercising her right but even more
that she was performing her duty."' 3 Gidel, Droit International Public
de laMer 633 (1934), translated and quoted in Juridical Regime, at 41.
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phous character of the facts available to support these claims
than a rigidly imposed requirement of certainty of proof,
which must inevitably demand more than the realities of
international life could ever yield." M. McDougal & W.
Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 372 (1962). Similarly
the 1962 United Nations study of historic waters notes that
the requirement of effective exercise of sovereignty over the
area by the appropriate action on the part of the claiming
state
"does not, however, imply that the State necessarily
must have undertaken concrete action to enforce its relevant laws and regulations within or with respect to the
area claimed. It is not impossible that these laws and
regulations were respected without the State having to
resort to particular acts of enforcement. It is, however,
essential that, to the extent that action on the part of the
State and its organs was necessary to maintain authority
over the area, such action was undertaken." Juridical
Regime, at 43.
Thus, although a coastal nation has the privilege to exclude
from its inland waters foreign vessels in innocent passage,
the need to exercise that privilege may never arise. Indeed,
in the present case, as the United States seems to concede,
the record does not indicate that there ever was any occasion
to exclude from Mississippi Sound foreign vessels in innocent
passage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. This is not surprising since,
as noted above, foreign nations have little interest in Mississippi Sound and have acquiesced willingly in the United
States' express assertions of sovereignty over the Sound as
inland waters. We conclude that the absence in the record
of evidence of any occasion for the United States to have exercised its privilege to exclude foreign navigation in innocent
passage from Mississippi Sound supports rather than disproves the claim of historic title to the Sound as inland
waters.

~

'
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In sum, we conclude that the evidence discussed in the Report of the Special Master and in Part III above, considered
in its entirety, is sufficient to establish that Mississippi Sound
constitutes a historic bay. The exception of the United
States to the Special Master's recommended ruling that the
whole of Mississippi Sound constitutes historic inland waters
is overruled. We repeat that we do not address the exceptions of Alabama, or those of Mississippi, or the exceptions of
the United States that relate to the question whether Mississippi Sound qualifies as a juridical bay. The recommendations of the Special Master and his Report, to the extent they
are consistent with this opinion, are respectively adopted and
confirmed. The parties are directed promptly to submit to
the Special Master a proposed appropriate decree for this
Court's consideration; if the parties are unable to agree upon
the form of the decree, each shall submit its proposal to
the Master for his consideration and recommendation. Each
party shall bear its own costs; the actual expenses of the Special Master shall be borne half by the United States and half
by Alabama and Mississippi.
·
The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further
proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such writs as from
time to time may be determined necessary or advisable to
effectuate and supplement the forthcoming decree and the
rights of the respective parties.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
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